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ABSTRACT 
From the latter half of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, consistently 
low stock sizes had effectively collapsed the fishery for the white sea urchin 
Tripneustes ventricosus (locally known as the sea egg) in Barbados.  In 2001, 
the sea egg stock recovered to a level that had not been observed during the 
preceding two decades.  Government authorities and scientists all agree that 
sustainability of the fishery can only be achieved through co-management 
arrangements that include fishers.  The resource’s wide distribution around the 
island and ease of accessibility negates the possibility of adopting the small-
scale community management model that has proved successful in the St. 
Lucia sea egg fishery.  From the latter half of the 1990s, a number of govern-
mental and non-governmental agencies have investigated the potential and 
means to co-manage this fishery.  The outputs of projects, conducted during 
the last five years, which facilitated fisher participation in resource assessment 
and analysis and examined ways of establishing formal co-management 
arrangements for the Barbados sea egg fishery, are examined in this paper.  
The multi-phase Coastal Co-management Project (CORECOMP) commenced 
in 2001, implemented first by the Caribbean Conservation Association (CCA) 
and then the Centre for Resources Management and Environmental Studies 
(CERMES) of the University of the West Indies (UWI).  As a result of these 
and other efforts, fisher participation in monitoring the status of the resource 
and in influencing management decisions to some degree has increased over 
the last five years.  However, a formal co-management arrangement for this 
fishery remains elusive for reasons that are biophysical, socio-economic and 
institutional.  
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Posibles vias para el Co-manejo de la Pesca de Erizo 
 de Mar en Barbados 
 
A partir de finales de los años 1980s y a lo largo de los 1990s la consisten-
te  baja en tamaños, ha logrado colapsar de manera efectiva la pesca de erizo 
de mar blanco Tripneustes ventricosus (conocidos localmente como huevos 
marinos) en Barbados.  En el 2001 la reserva de erizo de mar logró recuperarse 
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a un nivel que no se había observado durante las dos decadas pasadas.  Las 
autoridades de gobierno y los científicos coincidieron que la sostenibilidad de 
la pesca solo puede lograrse a través de acuerdos para el co-manejo que 
incluya a los pescadores.  La amplia distribución del recurso alrededor de la 
isla y su facil acceso niegan la posibilidad de adoptar un modelo de manejo 
comunitarioa pequeña escala que ha probado ser exitoso en la pesca de huevos 
marinos en Sta. Lucía.  A partir de finales de los años 1990s un sinnúmero de 
agencias gubernamentales y no gubernamentales han investigado el potencial y 
los medios para el co-manejo de esta pesquería.  Los resultados de proyectos, 
conducidos durante los pasados cinco años, que facilitaron la participación de 
pescadores en evaluación  y análisis del recurso y examinado las formas para 
establecer arreglos para un co-manejo formal para a pesca de huevos marinos 
en Babados, son examinados en esta ponencia.  El  multifase proyecto de Co-
manejo Costero (CORECOMP) inició en el año 2001, implementado inicial-
mente por la Asociación para la Conservación de Carribe (CCA) y  posterior-
mente por el Centro de Manejo de Recursos y Estudios Ambientales 
(CERMES) de la Universidad de West Indies (UWI)).  Como resultado de 
estos y otros esfuerzos, la participación de pescadores en el monitoreo del 
estatus del recurso y en influenciar decisiones para el manejo, hasta cierto 
grado, ha aumentado a lo largo de estos cinco años. Sin embargo, un arrreglo 
formal de co-manejo para esta pesca aún no se consolida por razones bio-
físicos, soco-económco e nstitucional. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVES:  Pesca de erizo de mar, CORECOMP, co-manejo 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Barbados sea egg (Tripnuestes ventricosus) fishery has been under 
legislative control since 1879.  Closed seasons, coinciding with the presumed 
peak reproductive period of the animals, have hitherto been the main regula-
tory mechanism employed for managing this fishery.  Historical records 
indicate that during this long period of management, the sea egg fishery has 
declined sufficiently on a number of occasions to become of concern for 
management authorities.  However, it was not until the mid-1980s that it was 
deemed that the local stock had collapsed.  Apart from a few years during 
which some moderate increases in stock sizes were noted, the stock remained 
in a depleted state for most years between the mid-1980s and throughout the 
1990s (Parker 2002, Mahon et al. 2003, McConney et al. 2003, Parker In prep).  
The collapse of the stock triggered a flurry of interest in the sea egg 
fishery from government, scientists, the general public, and of course, the 
fishers and called for investigations aimed at identifying the causes of the 
collapse and ways to rehabilitate the stock and subsequently manage the sea 
egg fishery in a sustainable manner.  From the early 1990s the consensus of 
researchers and management authorities was that management regulations 
requiring government enforcement would be unsuccessful.  Co-management 
arrangements involving fishers and government were recommended.  The 
Fisheries Division advocated co-management of the sea egg fishery in its first 
Fisheries Management Plan (FMP) for the period 1997 - 2000 (Fisheries 
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Division 1997).  All three subsequent FMPs have continued to promote co-
management of the fishery.  
 The 1997 - 2000 FMP promoted fisher participation in the manage-
ment of local fisheries in general not just for the sea egg fishery.  Indeed the 
FMP itself had been developed through a process that involved the participa-
tion of fishing industry stakeholders.  The organisation of fisherfolk into 
coherent bodies that could provide a collective representative voice for the 
fishing community was the first step in developing co-management.  However, 
up to the late 1990s, Barbadian fisherfolk organisations had deservedly earned 
the reputation of being ephemeral as they were usually only formed and active 
during times of perceived crises or as a means to lobby government to redress 
situations specific to their members.  The few longer-lasting organisations 
eventually came to rely heavily on government assistance to maintain them. 
With this history, it was clear that efforts on the part of government and other 
relevant non-governmental agencies were needed to forge viable and sustain-
able fisherfolk organisations (McConney et al. 1998).  
While a formal co-management arrangement is not yet in effect for the 
Barbados sea egg fishery, several strides have been made in facilitating the 
participation of fishers in the decision-making process.  A number of agencies, 
both governmental and non-governmental have been integral in the fostering of 
co-management of the fishery through specific projects.  Detailed reports of 
these projects have been produced with some remaining in the domain of “grey 
literature” and others published in mainstream journals.  However, it is 
important that these projects not to be viewed as isolated but rather as step-
ping-stones defining a path to the final goal of co-management.  To this end an 
overview of the significant outcomes, both successes and failures, of these 
projects in addition to other relevant issues such as the ecology of the resource 
and the framework of fisheries legislation, is needed to guide policy-makers 
and stakeholders.  The main objective of this paper is to provide such a guiding 
overview. 
 
 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The first laws governing the sea egg fishery were embodied in the Sea Egg 
Preservation Act of 1879.  The main regulatory mechanism in the Sea Egg 
Preservation Act was the establishment of an annual fishing closed season 
presumably planned to encompass the animals’ peak spawning season. 
Although the period between 1st April and 31st August, inclusive, was 
stipulated as the closed fishing season in the Act, a clause was also included 
giving the authorities the legal right to change the harvest period via an 
announcement in the Official Gazette.  Fines, terms of imprisonment and 
confiscation of fishing gear and boats were the punitive measures recom-
mended for breaking the laws embodied in the Act.  In 1904 the articles of the 
Sea Egg Preservation Act were retained in the Fisheries Regulation Act, which 
consolidated a number of pieces of fisheries legislation in existence at the time. 
Apart from occasional periodic increases in fines, it was the ending dates of the 
annual closed season and thus the start of the fishing season that was most 
often altered during the life of the Act. Adjustments to the dates of the closed 
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season notably only took place during the first half of the century until 1987 
when the closed season was extended to two-years to facilitate a harvest 
moratorium (Parker 2002, Parker In prep).  
The Fisheries Regulation Act was finally repealed and replaced with the 
Fisheries Act of 1993. The new Act mandated the appointment of a Chief 
Fisheries Officer (CFO) and charged him with the responsibility of managing 
and developing local fisheries.  In 1997 the first Fisheries Management Plan 
was produced in accordance with this edict.  The plan espoused co-
management of the sea egg fishery.  
In the Fisheries Act, stakeholder input into management decisions is 
facilitated through the appointment of a Fisheries Advisory Committee 
composed of representatives of government agencies and representatives of 
key sectors of the fishing industry.  The CFO is also given the option of 
consulting with stakeholders when preparing or reviewing a management 
scheme.  However a very important facet of the Fisheries Act is that the 
Minister responsible for fisheries ultimately must make all management 
regulations.  
The Fisheries Act does, in itself, not include any management regulations 
for the sea egg fishery but mandates the Minister to dictate appropriate 
regulations for the fishery.  It also provides the Minister with a range of 
management tools other than only closed seasons.  It was not until five years 
later, in 1998, that the first suite of fisheries regulations was enacted.  For sea 
eggs the tried and tested imposition of an annual closed season was retained, 
however fixed dates were not included up front, thus permitting dates to be set 
on an annual basis.  The option for restrictions on the use of fishing gear was 
exercised by banning the use of SCUBA for fishing sea eggs.  This also 
effectively set a depth range restriction aimed at protecting those sea eggs 
living at depths beyond the reach of free divers. 
 
Co-management encompasses several possible arrangements that are often 
depicted as a scale constructed from the relative sharing of responsibility and 
authority between government and stakeholders (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997, 
Berkes et al. 2001). McConney et al. (2003) suggest the following labels for 
three different degrees of co-management: 
i) Consultative co-management ― Government interacts often but 
makes all the decisions 
ii) Collaborative co-management ― Government and the stakeholders 
work closely and share decisions 
iii) Delegated co-management ― Government lets formally organised 
users/stakeholders make decisions 
 
In its present form, the Fisheries Act does not allow for the divestment of 
the governance of any fishery to user groups.  It de facto restricts power 
sharing through co-management to the level of collaborative co-management 
as defined above.  The potential exists for government both at the level of the 
CFO and the Minister to derail any management decisions or policies derived 
by any stakeholder group.  From a pragmatic perspective, verification that 
policy recommendations have originated from consultation with as many 
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stakeholders as possible will be the best defence against possible top-down 
governmental interventions.  A recognised representative stakeholder group 
with which government can interact is needed. 
 
 
THE STEPPING STONES TO CO-MANAGEMENT 
 Although, since 1879, management of the sea egg fishery was through 
state legislation, and thus “top-down” in nature; it appears that fishers were at 
least occasionally consulted in governance decisions for the fishery.  For 
example, no record has been found to suggest that any scientific study was 
used to fix the period for the fishing closed season first prescribed in 1879.  It 
can only be assumed that local knowledge, presumably mainly from fishers, 
was used to determine the timing of the animals’ peak reproductive season and 
thus the period for the closed season.  It was not until 1958 that a comprehen-
sive scientific study of the animals’ biology was published (Lewis 1958).  The 
study confirmed that the animals’ peak spawning period fell within the range 
of the closed season as had been prescribed by law since 1879.  
In 1899, fears of an imminent collapse of the sea egg fishery prompted the 
tabling of a bill in parliament calling for the imposition of a two-year harvest-
ing ban to protect the stocks.  A parliamentary committee mandated to 
investigate the issue consulted fishers before suggesting changes in the 
legislation that were duly enacted.  Correspondence between the Director of 
Agriculture and the Fisheries Officer in charge of the Fisheries Division 
suggest that in 1946 the Director wanted to open the fishery before the 
customary 1st September opening date.  While the Fisheries Officer conducted 
the logical science-based step of testing the readiness of the roe, he also 
obviously consulted fishers as he duly reported the divergent views of fishers 
from different communities on allowing an early start to the season.  No 
records of government-fisher consultations have been found for the next forty 
years and since the periods of the fishing season were not altered until 1987, it 
would appear that if there were any such consultations during that period, they 
did not result in altering the legislated status quo.  
In 1994, Vermeer et al (In press), conducted a questionnaire-based survey 
of 35 fishers on the potential for co-management of sea eggs in Barbados. 
About half of the fishers interviewed reportedly thought that community-based 
management groups could be formed or that community action could result in 
greater cooperation of fishers with management efforts.  The wide distribution 
of sea egg fishers around the island, and the fact that fishers traditionally freely 
operated from any site, indicated that the small community-based structure that 
was in place in St. Lucia to manage its sea egg fishery was not suitable for 
Barbados.  Instead, it was suggested that a flexible closed season be introduced 
and that fishers should be encouraged to conduct annual assessments of the 
stock and the timing and duration of fishing seasons, should be based on the 
results of these surveys following consultation with the Fisheries Division. 
Given the inherent unpredictability of the stock this was a very astute recom-
mendation.  Vermeer et al. also felt that fishers would be more likely to respect 
regulations that they had participated in developing.  While this approach 
would include volunteer fishers in the decision making process, it did not 
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suggest a mechanism to organise the fishers into a formal group that could be 
recognised as a representative decision making entity. 
In 1998 an ambitious project of the Coastal Zone Management Unit 
(CZMU) attempted to foster co-management of the fishery as was being 
advocated in the 1997-2000 FMP.  The goal of the project was to establish a 
co-management mechanism operated by the fishers themselves with technical 
and advisory support from the Fisheries Division (Mahon et al. 2003).  The 
first phase of the project involved identifying groups of fishers and contact 
persons in recognised fishing communities.  Dialogue with individuals and 
small groups was initiated and attempts were made to draw these persons into 
successively larger group meetings organised by key persons in the communi-
ties to reach consensus on management approaches.  The Technology of 
Participation (ToP) was used to develop a shared vision for the fishery and to 
develop a strategic plan for achieving the vision. 
One of the strategic directions identified at the end of the process was 
cooperating for the betterment of the industry.  In response to this call, 
attempts were made to establish a fisherfolk organisation.  The decision was 
made that the organisation should not be restricted to sea egg fishers but to all 
persons involved in dive fishing.  Fortuitously, the project was underway when 
Dr. Anton Atapattu, a Fisherfolk Organisation Development Adviser (FODA) 
was on assignment in Barbados with the express mandate to develop fisherfolk 
organisations.  The first meeting of the Barbados Fisherfolk Divers Association 
(BFDA) was held at the Fisheries Division in February 1999.  A constitution 
based along the same lines as for the other fisherfolk organisations and 
developed by the FODA was agreed to and the fishers present elected the 
seven-member executive (Mahon et al. 2003).  
However, attendance at the meeting was very poor.  This was attributed to 
the meeting coinciding with the peak of the pelagic fishing season when many 
fishers would be at sea.  It was decided that an interim executive committee 
could still be formed by those present and another general meeting be called 
when the pelagic fishing season was over.  The next meeting was held in 
August 1999 but turnout was even poorer and a meaningful electoral process 
could not go forward.  No further meetings were called, and attempts to form 
the fisherfolk organisation had failed. 
As Mahon et al. (2003), pointed out, the BFDA was unique to Barbados in 
that it focused on resource management rather than development and improve-
ment of conditions for fishers.  As a result great efforts on the part of govern-
ment would be needed to maintain its structure, especially when addressing 
contentious issues.  A more immediate problem was that its members were 
widely dispersed throughout the island.  As a result, members from different 
communities did not know each other well enough for the electoral process to 
be meaningful.  Due to a lack of human resources at the Fisheries Division, a 
familiarisation process could not be undertaken and was probably a major 
cause of the collapse of the organisation.  Despite the failure of the BFDA, the 
project demonstrated a willingness of fishers to participate in-group processes 
aimed at managing the fishery (McConney et al. 2003).  
In 2001, the Coastal Resources Co-management Project (CORECOMP), a 
3-year project of the Caribbean Conservation Association commenced. 
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CORECOMP offered assistance to the Fisheries Division and the Barbados 
Union of Fisherfolk Organisations (the umbrella organisation for local 
fisherfolk organisations) as the co-management partners to establish a pilot 
project on co-management of the sea egg fishery.  The project was especially 
timely and welcomed, since in 2001 the Barbados sea egg stock underwent 
what can only be deemed a dramatic recovery reaching abundances that had 
not been observed for over thirty years.  The stock recovery coincided with the 
expiration of a three-year harvest moratorium that was due to be lifted at the 
end of July.  With the lifting of the ban, the fishery would be opened with no 
co-management in place.  It was even more important that the stock be 
protected from another collapse due to over-harvesting.  
The first order of business was to assess the true status of the stock to 
advise the best policy to allow a sustainable harvest.  A proper scientific stock 
survey was therefore needed to determine appropriate start times for the 
harvest and duration of the fishing season to prevent over-fishing.  The time 
had come to establish the flexible harvest seasons and draw the fishers 
themselves into the scientific aspect of fisheries management and thus make 
them real participants in the management process, as was suggested by 
Vermeer et al. in 1994.  
The survey programme was designed by the Fisheries Division’s fisheries 
biologist and involved organising 16 volunteer fishers into four groups. 
Twenty-six index sites located around the island were chosen and the survey 
teams were assigned to survey a number of the sites with which they were 
most familiar.  A simple quadrat method was used to estimate population 
densities and the diameters of samples of the animals at each site were 
measured and recorded.  The sampling protocol and the rationales for collect-
ing the information were explained to fishers in both a classroom and field 
sessions by the biologist and an assistant.  The field surveys were conducted in 
July and August.  The results of the surveys were collated and analysed by the 
biologist, and the results explained to the fishers.  The fishers were also invited 
to actually input and manipulate the data themselves to further familiarise them 
with the scientific process of resource assessment.  The information generated 
by this collaborative research was used to prepare a policy paper to govern-
ment advocating a two-month fishing season starting from1st October.  Despite 
the delay in the start and the substantially reduced duration of the season, 
government accepted the recommendations and passed them into law.  Long-
standing traditions for managing the fishery had been altered through a 
collaborative effort of the Fisheries Division and fishers in a scientifically 
sound assessment. 
Similar surveys have been conducted in each successive year and the 
results used to determine the duration and timing of the annual seasons. 
However, funding of the successive surveys have been undertaken out of the 
Fisheries Division’s budget and have been constrained to fewer index sites.  In 
2002 and 2003 fisher involvement after submitting the survey data was much 
reduced and the final management decisions were largely made through 
consultations between BARNUFO and the Fisheries Division based on the 
survey results.  Due to a perceived reduction in the standing stock at several 
sites in 2002 compared with 2001, a one-month harvest season was recom-
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which was made somewhat shorter by days of inclement weather, proved very 
unpopular with a number of fishers who, with the assistance of some of their 
parliamentary representatives, successfully lobbied government to extend the 
season by one month against the public outcry of the president of BARNUFO. 
This event provided an example of how co-management decisions can be over-
turned under the present governance structure if not firmly supported by a large 
and representative body of stakeholders.  
In August 2004, the Fisheries Division held a meeting with the fishers 
involved in the stock surveys along with a number of other sea egg fishers and 
representatives of BARNUFO to facilitate consensus on the timing and dura-
tion of the upcoming fishing season.  Even one self-confessed sea egg poacher 
was deliberately invited to the meeting to benefit from his perspective. The 
results of the survey were discussed along with anecdotal information offered 
by the fishers present who were not involved in the survey.  The outcome of 
the meeting was truly that of compromise.  For example the durations of the 
seasons proposed by the fishers ranged from none at all to one month, the final 
recommendation being two weeks and the proposed start dates ranged from 1st 
September to 1st October, with 15th September being finally decided upon.  The 
outcome of this meeting clearly demonstrated that, for the sake of conserving 
the stock, well-informed fishers were quite willing to take tough stances that 
would be unpopular with many of their peers.  Such fishers had the makings of 
true managers.  It is noteworthy that, in spite of protests from some fishers, this 
extremely short fishing season, which was also much affected by inclement 
weather, was not extended. 
In 2002, the Caribbean Conservation Association (CCA), in association 
with the Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd. (MRAG) and Natural Re-
sources Management Program of the University of the West Indies (NRM-
UWI), implemented the Caribbean Coastal Co-management Guidelines Pro-
ject.  The objective of the project was “to ensure that integrated coastal man-
agement in the Caribbean is done in a way that involves and benefits those 
who depend on the resources of coastal areas, especially where there is pov-
erty” (McConney et al. 2003).  The Barbados sea egg fishery was chosen as a 
case study under this project.  The project comprehensively reviewed issues 
related to developing co-management of the Barbados sea egg fishery through 
use of document analysis, key informants, semi-structured interviews, ques-
tionnaire surveys, and workshops with all stakeholders.  
In May 2002, a multi-stakeholder project inception workshop was held 
involving persons involved in the sea egg fishery, fisheries authority, research-
ers, enforcement agencies, environmental NGOs and others to decide what the 
project should address.  The responses from the group included issues that had 
been cited on numerous previous occasions such as improved enforcement of 
the regulations including prosecutorial success, improved public education, and 
the formation of local area management to improve compliance.  During the 
fishing season, a questionnaire-based survey was conducted amongst sea egg 
fishers at three major harvesting sites to obtain their views on what was needed 
for the fishery.  Again, much of the same sentiments expressed by stakeholders 
reported in previous reports were reiterated.  However, of particular interest 
was that the majority of persons interviewed (60%) suggested that government  
  Parker, C. and M. Pena GCFI:57   (2006) Page 123  
 
mended and subsequently passed into law.  However, the shortened season, 
and fishers should equally share control of the fishery, and 70% also thought 
that fisherfolk organisations could help in management, although 75% of the 
respondents were not members of fisherfolk organisations.  One interpretation 
of these results is that many fishers want to have a say in management but 
don’t want to participate in the processes involved, such as becoming members 
of organisations themselves.  This suggests that they are more willing to have 
their opinions voiced through an emissary.  
 
 
THE STUMBLING BLOCKS 
Historical records clearly indicate that out of season poaching has been a 
feature of the sea egg fishery since the concept of a closed season was 
introduced.  There are numerous negative impacts of poaching on the manage-
ment of the fishery.  The activity directly undermines the benefits of the closed 
season (i.e. removal of the animals before they have spawned) and the need to 
take more animals during the spawning season to satisfy catch demands since 
the roe is not in a fit state for harvest (e.g. runny when spawning and very 
small after spawning).  As the level of poaching is unknown then accurate 
assessments of fishing effort cannot be made to advise management measures 
that involve controlling fishing effort. 
Effective ongoing monitoring supported by active enforcement along with 
punishments that adequately deter poaching are essential for converting 
legislation into real control.  Earlier works have already discussed in detail the 
possible contribution of fines that are small when compared with the potential 
financial gains from poaching sea eggs to the collapse of the stock during the 
1970s and 1980s (Parker 2002, Parker In prep.).  This weakness in the 
legislation was removed by the 1998 fisheries regulations that set maximum 
fines of $50,000 and/or two years imprisonment as punishment for sea egg 
poaching.  Despite these sterner potential penalties, anecdotal information 
tends to indicate that the incidence of sea egg poaching may actually have 
increased following the recovery of the sea egg stocks observed from 2001. 
A number of important contributing factors for this apparent increase in 
poaching incidents may be identified.  The first is that the overall increased 
number of sea eggs can support increased fishing effort whether legal or 
illegal.  The bitter irony here is that the animals left on the grounds by fishers 
who only harvested the animals within the substantially shortened fishing 
season then become the prey of the poachers.  The positive impacts made by 
the sacrifices of these many law-abiding fishers for the conservation and even 
increase of the stock in the first place thus increases the profitability of 
poaching.  This cannot engender cooperation in management.  
The second contributing factor is the existence of a lucrative black-market 
for the poached sea eggs reportedly largely fuelled by some of the wealthier 
and powerful residents of the island.  Fishers must surely view this situation as 
one of laws being only applicable to the poor.  
The third contributing factor to poaching is that although the courts have 
started imposing stiffer penalties for sea egg poaching, (maximum recorded 
was Bds. $2,500 in 2003), the fines still fall well below the maximum allow-
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able under law and are still effectively below the level at which the fisher 
would perceive that the cost of his capture exceeds the potential financial gains 
from poaching.  
Authorities have found the capture and subsequent conviction of sea egg 
poachers to be challenging exercises.  The rugged terrain of the coastline 
which fronts much of the more productive sea egg grounds in the north and 
southeast of the island is replete with small bays and beaches that are difficult 
or impossible to access by vehicles on land or by boats at sea.  These secluded 
areas are havens for poachers who use them as a landing site for their catches 
and if challenged by authorities can use the poor accessibility features to make 
good their escape when necessary.  In addition poachers often use lookouts to 
warn of the approach of enforcement officers and have developed clever 
strategies to quickly dump their catches and thus the evidence of their crime. 
The high incidence of successful poaching due to failures in enforcement has a 
snowballing effect, as more fishers perceive that the risk of punishment is low 
and capitalize on this weakness, while law-abiding fishers poach when they 
become anxious that few sea eggs will be left for them during the legal fishing 
season.  
An important aspect of successful management of the sea egg fishery is 
sensitisation of the general public to the rationales behind management 
measures.  The general public must be made aware of their role as stakeholders 
in the fishery.  Historically, sea egg poaching has been viewed as a very trivial 
offence, but as pointed out by McConney et al. (2003), this perception must be 
changed to one of outrage if management is to be successful.  Each of the 
major projects outlined in the previous sections have recognised this need for 
public education.  In response, an informational booklet on the sea egg fishery 
was produced out of the 1998 CZMU project (Mahon and Parker 1999) and an 
informational brochure was produced by the Fisheries Division in collabora-
tion with BARNUFO with funds supplied out of the CORECOMP project and 
the Oak Foundation.  In 2004 the Barbados Government Information Service 
produced a short (30 second) programme featuring the Fisheries Division’s 
Fisheries Biologist advising the general public against poaching sea eggs or 
purchasing poached sea eggs.  The clip was screened on numerous occasions 
prior to the opening of the season. Indications are that the clip was very 
successful at getting the simple message across to a very wide audience and 
this seems to be a useful format for public education. 
 
 
THE FINAL STEPS 
In November 2003, the Fisheries Division hosted a Sea Egg Fishery 
Management Small Group Meeting at the Fisheries Division as part of the post 
evaluation of the 2003 sea egg fishing season (McConney and Pena 2004). 
Participants included fishers that had participated in sea egg stock assessment 
surveys and other fishers who were known to be interested in participating in 
management.  The meeting also served as a forum to generate recommenda-
tions for inclusion in the Fisheries Management Plan for 2004 - 2006.  The 
fisheries biologist delivered a Powerpoint presentation outlining his recom-
mendations for managing the fishery and the rationales for them. From the 
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beginning of the meeting the fishers were advised that they were free to 
interject at any time to ask questions or offer comments (positive or negative) 
or offer suggestions.  Consensus agreement was sought on all relevant issues. 
Following discussions, the participants agreed among other things that: 
i) Closed seasons were the most appropriate management tool for the 
fishery. 
ii) The timing and duration of fishing seasons should be agreed on an 
annual basis following stock surveys, and the length of the season 
should be used as the means of controlling allowable catches. 
iii) Allowable catches should ensure that a reserve adult stock be retained 
at the end of each season. 
iv) More index sites should be surveyed necessitating the inclusion of 
more fishers in the programme. 
v) Licensing should not be introduced as a means of limiting the 
numbers of fishers involved; however, all fishers should be registered 
so that fishing effort can be determined. 
vi) The issue of the ban on the use of SCUBA gear in the fishery should 
be reviewed. 
vii) Poaching must be eliminated. 
viii) Public education on proper traditional harvesting techniques, such as 
testing roe quality before picking and leaving unripe animals, should 
be undertaken. 
 
An important aspect of the meeting was the introduction of a proposal for 
establishing a Sea egg Management Council (SMC) as a means of facilitating 
co-management.  The proposed council would comprise representatives of 
relevant government agencies including enforcement agencies, BARNUFO, an 
independent fisheries biologist and representatives of major sea egg fishing 
communities.  More than half the council’s membership would be fishers. 
Community representatives would be responsible for advising members of 
their communities on relevant issues and reporting the concerns and opinions 
of whom they represent to the council meetings.  The council would coordinate 
stock assessments, formulate management policies, and develop ways of 
enforcing any management regulations.  The fishers accepted the proposal in 
principle, and as a result, the recommendation was included in the 2004 - 2006 
FMP. 
A number of hurdles must necessarily be first overcome in developing the 
council.  For example, mechanisms will have to be put in place to allow 
communities to elect their representatives.  However, given the need to kick-
start the formation of the council, it is proposed that the representatives be 
appointed initially.  Financing of the council will also become an issue, as it is 
unlikely that participants will be willing to devote their time and effort to make 
the council work in the longer term for free.  While donor agencies and 
government would be willing to finance the initial set up stages, the council 
will have to eventually find ways to at least partially finance its work. 
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DISCUSSION 
Several features of the sea egg fishery, including the very nature of the 
animal and its market worth, make the resource vulnerable to overexploitation 
which can lead to fishery collapse.  For example, the animals are broadcast 
spawners, which makes spawning success highly dependent on the numbers of 
spawning animals and their proximity to each other.  The several factors that 
impact on the survival and transport of the animals through the long planktonic 
phase of their life cycle through settlement to the benthos, all make recruitment 
success highly unpredictable.  The animals live in shallow-water and are 
sedentary, making them easy to collect with minimal capital investment.  
Finally, there remains a ready local market, both legal and illegal, for this high-
priced commodity.  Based on these features alone, no management measures 
are likely to succeed without the cooperation of harvesters and the buying 
public.  To facilitate this, there is little doubt that the sea egg fishery would be 
best managed through a co-management arrangement. 
However, developing co-management of this fishery has proven to be a 
daunting task.  McConney et al. (2003) aptly describes co-management of the 
Barbados sea egg fishery as being only in the pre-implementation stage.  While 
industry representatives and enforcement agencies continue to demonstrate 
interest in co-management, patience may be wearing thin as the same issues 
are discussed at successive meetings without any apparent resolution 
(McConney and Pena, 2004).  Tangible successes are needed urgently. 
At some level there have been notable improvements in the level of fisher 
participation in governance.  So far, the only sustained fisher-government 
collaborative success has been in the annual resource assessments.  This has 
led to the now generally accepted norms of shorter fishing seasons with the 
possibility of variation from the traditional start date of 1st September.  It is 
now also accepted in principle by most involved in the fishery that the state of 
the stock should dictate the length and timing of the fishing season.  The level 
of impact that these changes on how the stock is exploited have had on its 
sustainability cannot be accurately measured.  However, certainly the fact that 
annual harvests following the 2001 stock recovery have been either fair or 
good must send the message to the public that the fishery is being managed 
with some success. 
However, many fishers not involved in the stock surveys customarily cast 
suspicion on the validity of the assessments and consider that longer fishing 
seasons would not endanger the stock.  It is understandable that there would be 
fears of coercion on the part of government when the same small group of 
fishers are repeatedly used to conduct the stock surveys on which the informa-
tion that advises this principal management measure.  To avoid this mispercep-
tion the assessments should be expanded to include more index sites on a 
regular basis.  This would not only improve the soundness of the survey 
programme from a scientific perspective, but also will draw new fishers into 
the programme. In addition, anecdotal information on stock status and other 
relevant information should be systematically collected from a wider group of 
fishers for the same reasons.  The policy of inclusion in the area of information 
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gathering must be improved. 
Finally, formal fisher participation in the decision making process must be 
extended beyond the information gathering stage.  Again, at this level a 
mechanism must be put in place to draw the opinions of all stakeholders 
together.  Stakeholders in this context include government agencies as well as 
fishers.  This is the only way that critical management measures can be dealt 
with in a frank, transparent manner.  The proposed Sea Egg Management 
Council will be one such mechanism. 
It is however, unlikely that sea egg fishers on their own have the will or 
capacity to organise themselves to facilitate self-representation.  To this end 
the Fisheries Division must take the lead in nurturing this process.  Limitations 
on human resources at the Division are unlikely to change in the near future. 
However, one hitherto unmentioned intangible benefit of the long years of this 
co-management process is the creation of a number of personal alliances 
between Fisheries Division staff, BARNUFO and the sea egg fishing commu-
nity.  A number of people who would make meaningful contributions to the 
development and success of the council are thus known to the Fisheries 
Division.  These persons should be brought together in an effort to kick-start 
the development of the council.  However processes whereby fishers can select 
their own representatives should be developed as soon as possible. 
It seems unlikely that Government will be inclined in the near future to 
release its primary control on managing this fishery, which is of such eco-
nomic, social and cultural importance to the island.  However it is more 
probable that the recommendations of the council would be sufficiently 
weighty to effectively advise government policy once it demonstrates that it 
truly represents the majority of stakeholders. 
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